



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

WORLD-POLITICS.

LONDON : PARIS : WASHINGTON.

LONDON, *July, 1908.*

THE days when Englishmen were indifferent to and conspicuously ignorant of American politics have happily passed. I do not mean to imply that a subject so vast, so tangled and so remote from their daily concerns very vividly interests them, or that their acquaintance with it is by any means profound. But ten Englishmen of influence and authority now visit "the States" for every one that went there a decade ago; it is a reproach not to have a reasonable working knowledge of the American Constitution and American questions; and the English press has splendidly fostered the desire for Transatlantic news.

There can, at any rate, be no question that the interest displayed by Englishmen in the Republican and Democratic Conventions was very great, that the information published about them in the London journals was abundant enough to satisfy the most ardent inquirer into American politics, and that the comments upon their results showed good sense and a considerable degree of knowledge. To all but a very few Englishmen Mr. Taft is personally unknown; but, from the moment he became a Presidential possibility, his career was fully "written up" and the man in the street has by now a very fair idea both of his personality and of what he has accomplished in the Philippines, in Cuba, at Panama and as the handy man of the Roosevelt Administration.

Unlike Mr. Taft, Mr. Bryan has visited England and has met and spoken with most of the leading journalists and politicians. He went away, I believe, very well pleased with his reception, but probably quite ignorant of the impression he had left behind. It was not a very favorable impression. He is the last type of

man who would be elected to high office in this country, and Englishmen, as a rule, find the idea of him as President of the United States well-nigh inconceivable. As a man of courage, blameless life and character, and of an aspiring but not a self-seeking disposition, he commands their sympathy and to some extent their admiration. There is a feeling, too, in England that he has borne himself manfully under defeat, and that, after blazing the trail for Mr. Roosevelt, he has been unlucky in seeing most of his policies annexed by his opponents. With the social protest which, even in 1896, was the true backbone of Bryanism, a great many Englishmen—practically, indeed, all English Radicals—are in sympathy. But they remember his currency heresies and his vapid attacks upon Imperialism, and they are wholly disconcerted by the levity with which in the last twenty months he has suddenly taken up, and as suddenly dropped, such gigantic issues as the nationalization of the trunk railway lines, the introduction of the initiative and the referendum and the question of a Government guarantee for bank deposits. What it comes to is that, while Englishmen like Mr. Bryan personally, they rate his mental capacities rather low, are wholly sceptical of his powers of statesmanship, regard him pre-eminently as a talker and cannot find any reason to suspect that he possesses any hidden gift for the work of administration.

In domestic affairs, politics during the last few weeks has had to contend with the attractions of a perfect June and of an exceptionally full and brilliant "season." This Government, however, has not yet lost the knack of being interesting. The progress of the Old Age Pensions Bill through Committee, the parades and other demonstrations of the woman suffragists, the fight over the Miners' Eight Hours Bill and the highly "popular" discussion aroused by the Daylight Saving Bill, have furnished, along with a bye-election or two, plenty of material for political debate. As to the Old Age Pensions measure, the inevitable process of enlarging its scope and increasing its expense has already begun. Instead of the \$30,000,000 which Mr. Asquith talked about, the country is now informed that \$37,500,000 will be the minimum cost of the experiment in its opening year. Many of the safeguards that were included in the original scheme have disappeared. The inquiry into the character of applicants for pensions has been whittled down to a mere formality. A

sliding scale has been substituted in place of the fixed minimum income of \$2.50 a week that was to entitle to a pension. The age limit remains at seventy, but for how long no man dare prophesy. The disqualification of paupers also remains, but it is avowedly provisional; it is not likely to survive the general revision of the Poor Law which is to be the great work of 1909, and its removal, which is one of the certainties of the future, means an addition of at least \$20,000,000 a year. The clause under which married couples of seventy and over, if living together, were to receive less than the sum of two full pensions has already been abandoned. The second reading of the measure was carried by an enormous majority, only a handful of the Opposition daring to vote against it. But, except for the Socialists and the Labor party, no man is quite at ease in the depths of his mind; no one can foresee where the financial demands are to end; no one is even able to state with any show of plausibility how, in the face of an inevitable increase in the Navy estimates, Mr. Lloyd George is to find the money for floating the scheme; and no Free Trader, above all, can be sure that Old Age Pensions may not prove the grave of Free Trade.

Since Mr. Asquith undertook to accept an amendment in favor of woman suffrage, in the Electoral Reform Bill which he has promised for next year, provided that the amendment was a "democratic" one and that the majority of men and women approved it, the suffragists have organized two monster demonstrations to convince him that their movement has the support of the sex. One of the first results of their renewed activities, however, has been to rally the women who are opposed to the agitation and who do not wish to be dragged into politics by their more vehement sisters. An Anti-Suffrage League, with many prominent ladies at the head of it, has been formed and will, I think, undoubtedly carry on a vigorous propaganda. But the suffragists, being the more vocal and the more determined, are also, in my judgment, the winning force. I cannot question the ultimate success of their movement; though when and on what conditions their victory will be achieved are beyond my powers of speculation. Mr. Asquith's proviso that the suffrage must be "on a democratic basis" was designedly cryptic, but practical politicians interpret it as meaning that all women over twenty-one who can qualify as householders are to receive the vote. To

admit to the Parliamentary franchise merely those women who have property of their own would be to make a free gift to the forces of Conservatism—an object for which Liberals, naturally enough, feel no enthusiasm. It is probable, therefore, that to be acceptable to the Government the amendment, in addition to including all women with property in their own right, would also place on the register all married women whose husbands were already entitled to vote. This could be done by making the wife a joint householder, for electoral purposes, with her husband; but whether the Lords will agree to so vast an extension of the suffrage, and what will happen if they refuse, are points of very great uncertainty. Nor is it possible to do more than surmise the opinions either of the majority of men or of the majority of women on the whole question. The main reason for believing that woman suffrage in England is only a question of time rests, after all, on the conviction that politicians on the hunt for votes can be badgered into anything.

A measure which has not shown the Government to the best advantage is the Miners' Eight Hours Bill—a Bill for restricting the average time of employment for miners below ground to eight hours a day, with a maximum of sixty hours' overtime *per annum*. The Bill has been hotly attacked, and the fear of dear coal which it has imprinted on the mind of the average man was undoubtedly a powerful factor in the recent bye-elections. How far that fear is justified, it is impossible, in the face of so much conflicting evidence, for an outsider to determine. The mine-owners and the heads of many industries, in which coal plays a vital part, have estimated that the Bill, if it becomes law, will reduce the output of coal by twenty-six million tons a year, and will throw upon the consumer an extra burden of anywhere from \$100,000,000 to \$500,000,000 *per annum*. These figures, I need hardly say, are keenly challenged, but the select committee which inquired into the whole subject reported that the establishment of a fixed eight-hours day, whether at a stroke or gradually, "cannot but result in a temporary contraction of output and a consequent period of embarrassment and loss to the country at large." The Government has been so far influenced by this Report as to defer for five years the final introduction of the eight-hours system. But the concession has merely lost them a few friends without winning over any enemies; and there can

hardly, I think, be much doubt that the general public views the measure with extreme disfavor. Coal is the basis of Great Britain's industrial position. In many of her largest industries, in iron, steel and shipping, the cost of coal represents from forty to fifty per cent. of the cost of production and maintenance. Anything, therefore, that artificially reduces the output or raises the price of coal is bound to make its influence felt, not only in every household, but through all branches of British trade. The struggle, it is pointed out, is not one between miners and mine-owners, but between the mining industry and the nation. All the old arguments that have done duty a hundred times before to prove the iniquity of Governmental interference with adult labor are being trotted out again, and still, I dare say, find people to believe in them. But even those who disbelieve in them may well feel puzzled to decide on the merits of this particular measure. The balance of its advantages and its disadvantages is very even. Except among the Labor men (who are by no means unanimous in its support), it finds no really hearty backers, while its enemies are legion. From the party standpoint I imagine that most Liberals would be well pleased to see it done to death in the Lords. They fear its passage, and they well might. No Government in the world would willingly appeal to the country at a time when its legislation had sent up the price of so indispensable a requisite in the home and in the factory as coal.

PARIS, July, 1908.

IT is not often that the present writer can advert to three important questions which have just come to what may safely be called their conclusions. But this is actually his privilege to-day, for the nationalization of the Western Railway, the recall of the French troops from Morocco and the final and complete separation of Church and State can be looked upon as history.

The success of the Bill for the nationalization of the Western Railway is a curious paradox: it must be described as nothing less than a victory of M. Clémenceau over his friends, thanks to the assistance of his enemies. On taking office M. Clémenceau had declared that he intended to devote his energies to the accomplishment of three reforms, one of which was the nationalization of the Western Railway, and the other two an Income Tax and an Old Age Pension Fund. Apart from their intrinsic

merits, these reforms were made necessary at that time, on the one hand, by the feeling of distaste caused by the crude anti-clericalism of M. Combes, and, on the other, by the expediency of mollifying the Socialists by borrowing something of their own programme instead of turning them into desperate enemies.

The announcement of the nationalization of the Western Railway was well received in the country. This was, no doubt, another breach of a solemn contract, as the railways are not to be made over to the State before ninety-nine years from their establishment; but the Western Railway had long been threatened with legal dispossession, and the many Americans who have experienced its deficiencies on most of the lines starting from the Montparnasse and Saint-Lazare stations will not marvel at the popular hostility against it.

The Bill was passed through the Chamber, as the most difficult Bills generally are, with amazing rapidity. In such cases the Deputies always trust that the Cabinet will be overthrown and a new Bill brought in, or that the Senate will undertake to make any modifications that may be needed. In fact, the Senate, though strongly in favor of the Premier, evinced from the first quite an exceptional dislike to the idea. The French Senate, though far more numerous and of considerably less influence and power than the corresponding body at Washington, is superior to the Chamber, and consists of men, as a rule, comparatively independent. But, for this very reason, they are likely to be antagonistic to any measure looking like an attack on private property. Not only was the Committee appointed to examine the Bill as sent up from the Chamber almost unanimously opposed to it, but all the Senators suspected of being favorable to it were excluded from the Budget Committee, which is regarded as the most important one. Even M. Léon Bourgeois, who could have been President of the Senate if he had so chosen, was not spared the slight. So it appeared almost immediately that there would be more or less open warfare between the Government and the Senate on this subject.

The reproach of a Socialistic tendency was never made very seriously against the authors of the Bill; the mismanagement of the Company was too evident for that. But the Chairman of the Committee, M. Prevet, insisted all the time that the Government was laying, under pretence of righting a hopeless

situation, an enormous burden on the national finances. In fact, it appears from calculations which have never been seriously contradicted that the yearly expenditure for keeping the railway in proper working order will be at least four million dollars, exclusive of numberless legal cases in which the Government is not, by any means, sure of getting the better of its opponents. The Minister of Public Works, M. Barthou, always contented himself with saying that the state of affairs was getting worse every day for the passengers in the Western trains, that the only remedy was nationalization and that the same step had had been taken in Germany, Belgium and Italy, without any detriment to the State, and without any suspicion of Socialism. Meanwhile, the Committee, hearing of certain private documents necessary to their investigation, applied for them to the Minister, but in vain; and the refusal produced a state of irritation which bordered on resentment when the *discussion générale* — corresponding to committee work in Washington and London—began in the Senate.

The advantage lay throughout with M. Prevet against M. Barthou, who seemed to be supported only by a very few benches at the Extreme Left, and when this preparatory debate was drawing near its close (a vote on the advisability of discussing the various clauses of the Bill), a casual observer would have had no hesitation in predicting a total defeat of the Cabinet, the more so as some officious Senators were endeavoring to ward off the catastrophe by bringing about fresh negotiations between the Government and the Company.

However, considerations other than economical were to carry the most weight, M. Clémenceau, who had never spoken a word in the Senate, openly said that he was sure of a majority of twenty-five votes, and his calculation proved correct. The Senate certainly hated the idea of dispossession by the State of a large company, but they dreaded much more the dispossession by M. Combes of the first Cabinet that ever was able to withstand the efforts of the Socialists. The reader may remember what I said in a previous letter of a conspiracy, exclusively and miserably political, between M. Combes and M. Jaurès, to repair the old *Bloc*. But the restoration of the *Bloc* means nothing if not the Socialist hegemony, a few years of which were almost sufficient to ruin the army and navy, and leave France helpless in the

hands of the Confederacy of Labor. Even the dullest politician, outside the Socialist group and the crew of malcontents headed by M. Combes, realizes that Clémenceau has lifted France out of a most dangerous situation, and it requires the blind vanity of the Radical-Socialists to imagine that government is possible with the concurrence of Jaurès. The practical sense of the landowners, manufacturers and lawyers in the Senate places them above all danger of such a delusion. In spite of appearances, they were consequently resolved to keep Clémenceau in office even at the cost of their pride.

The day before the division a scene took place in the Senate which nobody, only three years ago, could have thought possible. M. Rouvier, the ex-Premier, the only French politician comparable to Clémenceau for lucidity of mind and spirit, actually besought him in pathetic language to desist from a resolution that would only humiliate the Parliament and make them feel as if they were trembling under another Louis XIV. Clémenceau was inexorable, and treated his colleagues of yesterday not as an absolute monarch, but as a strong man will treat trembling children whose safety depends on his presence. He good humoredly told them that he could not unsay what he had said on taking office, and that he could not be content with playing forever the rôle of a gendarme. The measure taken against the Western Railway was reasonable, and the Senate had the choice between passing it and looking for another Cabinet.

The division took place at once amidst the greatest agitation, and resulted in a majority of three for the Cabinet, the three votes undoubtedly of the Ministers present. This was a narrow escape; but, as usual in such occurrences, the majority rose immediately to twenty, then to thirty and finally to thirty-eight; and seventeen Senators who had not dared vote at all in the first division came penitently to explain, amidst general laughter, that they could not understand how their names had been omitted, considering that they had always been favorable to the Bill. This was the farcical *dénouement* of what had nearly been a tragedy, the President of the Senate promising most seriously to set an inquiry on foot and leave no stone unturned to know what had become of the vanished tickets.

A few days before this memorable sitting, the Foreign Minister had declared to the Chamber that General d'Amade had received

orders to bring his troops back to Casablanca. The announcement was received with great applause by the Socialists, but with astonishment by everybody else. No recent event had led to an anticipation of such a decision, and everything had seemed contrary to it. The Premier had closeted himself for two days, some weeks ago, with General Lyautey, and the latter on his return to Algeria had behaved as if he had been given *carte blanche*, while General d'Amade pursued a more and more energetic action in the Chaouïa. The almost unbroken success of the troops under this General, after the temporizing campaign of his predecessor, General Drude, had given confidence to the country. There was no protest when the Foreign Minister or M. Clémenceau laughed to scorn the ominous utterances of M. Jaurès: the Chamber had grown quite used to the idea of war. Certainly, M. Ribot and the "*Journal des Débats*" would still occasionally point out possible dangers; but the press, as a rule, had adopted a warlike tone which it had long unlearned. The "*Temps*," more especially, published several articles during the President's visit to King Edward, which simply viewed the war with Germany and the weight of the *entente cordiale* as if a quarrel had been a certainty. One of the best-known writers in the same paper, M. Tardieu, said that during a recent visit to the United States he had become convinced that the spirited action of General d'Amade in Morocco had done more than all the alliances and agreements and *ententes* to modify the notion held by many Americans that France was on the down grade to decay, and the public seemed to adopt the same view. In short, the Moroccan war had so completely ceased to be a bugbear that it was looked upon, in all quarters, rather as a national tonic. There was, therefore, blank disappointment when the official despatches to General d'Amade were read to the Chamber, and many people have not yet recovered from the feeling.

The motives of M. Clémenceau for changing thus abruptly a policy which had been identified with his name are not clearly apparent; the Chaouïa district has certainly been restored to order, and the marauders who swarmed all over that region, after the Casablanca massacre, will not easily forget the punishment they have received; but tranquillity is far from being secured in the rest of the Empire. Who can tell what the consequences of Moulay-Hafid's inevitable victory over his brother

will be? There would be some prospect of tranquillity really prevailing in Morocco, on the lines of the Algeciras Act, if the Sultan, in whose behalf the Conference took place, were the real sovereign; but he is not, and, to all intents and purposes, the Sultan is Moulay-Hafid—that is to say, a creature and, possibly to-morrow, an agent of Germany.

There may be secret reasons for abandoning Morocco just when every apparent motive seems to point the other way. It may be, also, that M. Clémenceau is, after all, averse to a colonial policy, and,—as M. Cochin told him rather bitterly,—repeats in Morocco what he once did in Egypt. He has energy, decision and intrepidity; but in spite of his dare-devil ways, there is nothing venturesome in his nature. When he has carefully weighed all motives and consequences, he is never daunted from his purpose, and carries his decision through smilingly, but he must have seen clearly what the consequences are likely to be. This is firmness, not audacity. The Premier is more of a Parisian than of a Frenchman. The old French spirit of enterprise is replaced in him by a sober sense of what is possible and what is not, and his recklessness is confined within those limits. It should be added that since 1870 this disposition has been in perfect keeping with the national temper.

Of Church affairs there has been little to be said lately, as all that might be worth noticing is more preparation for a future which does not seem very near than actual occurrences. But we can now record the epilogue of the difficult process known as the Separation of Church and State.

This momentous step was,—it will be remembered,—initiated by the State less under the pressure of facts than under the influence of one of those logical fallacies to which the French mind is wonderfully prone. It seemed to be an admirable policy in the State to ignore the Church, as if such an attitude had not been utterly impossible even in the case of communities much less important than the Roman Church. The difficulty appeared at once when the first Separation Law was debated in 1905. The then Minister of Worship, M. Briand, was soon brought to seek a neutral ground in the constitution of the famous Cultural Associations, the lay members of which were to be the connecting link between the clergy and Government. This arrangement Rome rejected as ignoring the rights of the hierarchy.

The immediate consequence was the confiscation of all Church property and the appropriation by all the municipalities of the places of public worship. However, these places having to remain exclusively dedicated to their original purpose, some sort of agreement was to intervene between the parish boards and the local clergy. M. Briand suggested a yearly declaration to the mayor, but this again fell through, partly through the fault of the Government, but to the evident satisfaction of Rome, and the legal status of the Church of France remained a problem. The solution, or at least the first elements of a possible solution, seemed to have been found some weeks ago on the occasion of a debate on the devolution of the position of Church property that was invested in stock. Five million dollars of this belonged to Funds for the Aged Clergy, but were going, like the rest, to be made over to municipal charities, when the Abbé Lemire succeeded in impressing the Chamber with a sense of the enormity of such a confiscation, and proposed that the sum in question should be lodged with Mutual Assistance Societies, whereupon a Protestant Senator, M. Berger, suggested in his turn that the sums bequeathed to the churches towards religious services for the dead should also be rescued from the general disaster and handed over to the same Societies. Both amendments were passed, and there was a feeling in the country not only that had a piece of iniquity been avoided, but that there was a chance of coming to further arrangements on the same basis. Among the French clergy who have had no chance of being more than passive between Rome and the French Government the satisfaction was unmixed; and the disappointment was great—in spite of the immediate adhesion of all the Bishops—when Rome forbade any steps on the part of the clerical Societies of Assistance to claim back the property offered to them.

Into the motives or, I should say, causes of the Pope's decision this is not the place to enter. Suffice it to say that it was only welcomed with unmitigated joy by men—oftener lay than clerical—who look upon religious fights as promoting political views which have, in fact, nothing to do with religion. It is a cruel truth that the Church of France is as ill served by some of her so-called friends as by her enemies. For the present she is like a nondescript in the country, and her future is by no means clear.

WASHINGTON, July, 1908.

ALMOST the whole of the week ending July 11th was spent in Denver, Colorado, by the Democratic National Convention in formulating a platform and designating nominees, whereas, as a matter of fact, all its business might have been transacted within twelve hours in Mr. Bryan's house near Lincoln, Nebraska. As the event showed, the nomination of Mr. Bryan for the Presidency by a majority of more than two-thirds of the delegates was assured unalterably before the Convention was opened, and, subsequently, not a contestant was seated, nor was a single plank fixed definitely in the platform, without Mr. Bryan's approval. Never in our political history has a body, nominally representative, been dominated so absolutely by one man. The Republican National Convention, which met in June in Chicago, was accused of being a mere machine, of which President Roosevelt was the engineer, every movement being dictated from the White House. The truth is that the anti-Roosevelt wing of the Republican party, piloted by Speaker Cannon, succeeded in thwarting a part of Mr. Roosevelt's intentions, so far as the platform of his party was concerned, and in choosing a nominee for the Vice-Presidency whom it is hard to believe that Mr. Roosevelt can have desired. By contrast with the slavish subservience evinced at Denver to the will of an autocrat, the Chicago Convention was an impressive example of freedom of speech and action on the part of the freely chosen spokesmen of a part of a free people. It is true that, in dealing with contesting delegations, the Committee on Credentials at Chicago was charged with employing a steam-roller, but nothing done at Chicago was comparable for cynical defiance of justice with the treatment at Denver of the McCarren delegates from Brooklyn and the Guffey delegates from Philadelphia. It was shrewdly said by an onlooker that the acts and declarations of the Denver Convention are invested with no moral authority, because they reflected nothing except the supposed self-interest and individual determination of an unscrupulous boss.

Of the candidate for the Presidency put forward at Denver nothing can now be said which has not been said repeatedly during the last twelve years. Mr. Bryan is not a Democrat. He is a Populist, or, in other words, a Socialist, so far as he thinks it prudent to carry Socialism at this time. Could he have had his

way in 1896 we should have had the free coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to one, and he still advocated the same ruinous measure in 1900. Mr. Bryan also demanded twelve years ago that the power to issue notes to circulate as money should be taken from the national banks, and that all paper money should be issued directly by the Treasury Department, and receivable for all debts, public and private. In effect, this demand was obviously one for unlimited greenbacks, and was taken bodily from the Populist platform. In 1896, he did not blush to advocate the packing of the United States Supreme Court in order to secure a reversal by that tribunal of its decision against an income tax. In 1896, Mr. Bryan vigorously supported the sweeping attack on the Federal judiciary which was embodied in the pseudo-Democratic platform of that year. That, at heart, he wishes to go much farther in a Socialist direction than, as yet, his partisans are willing to accompany him is evident from the fact that, on several occasions during the last three years, he has urged the national ownership of railways. The facts here cited suffice to justify the assertion that a party willing to nominate a third time for the Presidency a man identified with the doctrines named has forfeited the right to call itself Democratic.

As for the nominee for the Vice-Presidency, Mr. John W. Kern of Indiana, his nomination was notoriously dictated by Mr. Bryan with exclusive reference to the campaign in Indiana. That he is not a man possessing the courage of his convictions is manifest, because, in 1896, although a believer in the gold standard, and opposed as a lawyer to any crippling of the equity powers of the Federal Courts, he gave his support to Mr. Bryan and the Chicago platform of that year. Touching the help that he is likely to give his ticket in the State of which he is a resident, we merely note that, when he ran for Governor in 1900, he was beaten by 25,000 votes, and four years later, when again a candidate for the same office, by about 85,000.

As for the platform put forth at Denver, we can best indicate the view which reasonable citizens are likely to take of it by comparing it with the platform on which Mr. Taft is standing. With regard to the revision of the tariff, the Denver platform is much more restrained than was that fashioned at Chicago in 1892, and much less sharply distinguished from the Republican programme, which itself declares unequivocally for a revision

of the tariff at a special session of Congress to follow immediately the inauguration of the next President. The Denver platform, however, would place upon the free list all foreign articles competing with American products controlled by trusts; whereas the Republican programme asserts that, in all tariff legislation, the true principle of protection is best maintained by the imposition of such duties as will equal the difference between the cost of production at home and the cost of producing similar articles abroad. Under all the circumstances, it is improbable that tariff revision will play a conspicuous part in the coming contest at the ballot-box. The difference between the two platforms, as regards their respective attitude towards Federal Courts and the issue of injunctions, is less marked than it was in 1896. The Republican party declared this year at Chicago that it would at all times uphold the authority and integrity of the Federal Courts, and would ever insist that their powers to enforce their process and to protect life, liberty and property shall be preserved inviolate. The belief, however, was expressed in June last at Chicago that the rules of procedure in the Federal Courts with respect to the issuance of the writ of injunction should be more accurately defined by statute, and that no injunction or temporary restraining order should be issued without notice, except where irreparable injury would result from delay, in which case a speedy hearing thereafter should be granted. The Denver platform also professes to regard the Courts of justice as the bulwark of our liberties, and declares that "we yield to none in our purpose to maintain their dignity." It is pronounced "an unjust reflection upon a great body of our citizens to assume that they lack respect for the Courts." Nevertheless, the delegates to Denver aver that experience has proved the necessity of a modification of the present law relating to injunctions, and proclaim themselves in favor of a measure which passed the United States Senate in 1896, and which provided for trial by jury in cases of indirect contempt. There is no doubt that the authority of a Court of Equity would be seriously crippled if a person guilty of indirect contempt (by which is meant a person not in the actual presence of a Court) had a right to claim a trial by jury. It is very questionable whether such an attempt to limit the power of a Court of Equity to uphold its orders would not be pronounced unconstitutional.

Now let us mark what the two platforms say about trusts and corporations. The Chicago platform recalls the fact that the Republican party passed the Sherman anti-trust law over Democratic opposition, and enforced it after Democratic dereliction. According to the Chicago platform, however, experience has shown that the effectiveness of the Sherman anti-trust law can be increased by such amendments as will give to the Federal Government greater supervision and control over those corporations engaged in interstate commerce which have power and opportunity to create monopolies. The Denver programme, on its part, favors rigorous enforcement of the criminal law against guilty trust magnates and officials, and demands the enactment of such additional legislation as shall make it impossible for a private monopoly to exist in the United States. Among the new remedies specified at Denver are a law forbidding the duplication of directors among competing corporations; a Federal license for corporations controlling twenty-five per cent. of any product; a prohibition of any corporation's controlling more than fifty per cent. of a given product; and the enforcement of equality of prices in all parts of the country, with allowance for the cost of transportation. It is obvious that the Federal license proposal, if accepted, would invest a President with still more power than he now possesses, power that might be wielded for political effect. With reference to the regulation of railroads, we observe that the Republican platform would amend the interstate commerce law so as to give railroads the right to make and publish traffic agreements, subject to the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission, though maintaining always the principle of competition between lines naturally competing. The Denver platform, on the other hand, gives the Interstate Commerce Commission what it does not now possess, to wit, the initiative in actions against companies without waiting for complaints. Touching this proposal, it has been pointed out that to give the Interstate Commerce Commissioners, who are appointees of the Chief Magistrate, power to reduce rates where no complaint has been made by shippers, is to invite the President to order such reductions solely for political effect. Such a power can safely be entrusted to no Executive while the Government of the United States continues to be a football of party politics.

Among the planks which are similar in both platforms may be mentioned postal savings-banks; the improvement of inland waterways; the endorsement of the civil service system; separate Statehood for New Mexico and Arizona; the better protection of the public health; better roads, and a strong navy. The Denver Convention, however, failed to urge the following demands, which were included in the Republican programme, namely, free rural mail delivery for farmers everywhere, the endorsement of international arbitration and a centennial celebration of Lincoln's birth next year. The Denver Convention also omitted to express confidence in a revival of business, or a hope that Cuba would soon be able to resume her sovereignty. A careful comparison of the more important planks here defined is likely to arouse in the thoughtful reader a feeling of wonder whether the delegates to Denver really believed that further threats would re-establish confidence and credit, reopen factories, fill empty freight-cars, and restore wages to the multitude of the unemployed.

If, now, we are asked what likelihood of success has the ticket framed at Denver, we answer that hopelessness was self-confessed when Mr. John W. Kern was selected as the nominee for the Vice-Presidency. If Judge George Gray of Delaware, or ex-Governor Douglas of Massachusetts, or President Woodrow Wilson of Princeton University, New Jersey, could have been prevailed upon to accept the nomination for that office, the ticket made at Denver might have had some prospect of victory in the Eastern States. As things are, Mr. Bryan must win in the Middle West, if anywhere; and his chance of triumph in Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio and even Indiana must be admitted to be desperate.